Philosophical discourse and ascetic practice : on Foucault’s Readings of Descartes’ Meditations by Lorenzini, Daniele









This paper addresses the multiple readings that Foucault offers of Descartes’
Meditations during the whole span of his intellectual career. It thus rejects the
(almost) exclusive focus of the literature on the few pages of the History of
Madness dedicated to the Meditations and on the so-called Foucault/Derrida
debate. First, it reconstructs Foucault’s interpretation of Descartes’ philosophy in
a series of unpublished manuscripts written between 1966 and 1968, when Foucault
was teaching at the University of Tunis. It then addresses the important shifts that
took place in Foucault’s thought at the beginning of the 1970s, which led him to
elaborate a new approach to the Meditations in terms of ‘discursive events’. Finally, it
argues that those shifts opened up to Foucault the possibility of developing an ori-
ginal reading of Descartes’ philosophy, surprisingly close to his own interest in
ancient ask esis and the techniques of the self.
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I
The few pages of the History of Madness (1961) dedicated to the
Meditations on First Philosophy, and in particular to the exclusion of
madness in the path of the Cartesian doubt,1 have attracted the attention
of scholars in an (almost) exclusive way when addressing the topic of
Foucault’s reading of Descartes. The fact that, with the exception of The
Order of Things (1966), Descartes is virtually absent from the other books
that Foucault published during his lifetime, together with the famous
Foucault/Derrida ‘debate’ on the History of Madness that took place
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between the early 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s (Derrida, 1963;
Foucault, 2001b, 2001c),2 greatly contributed to confining the scholarly
discussion to this specific point, even though Foucault made it very clear
that Descartes only played a marginal role in theHistory of Madness, and
his interpretation of the Meditations could have been left out of the book
without any significant consequence for its main argument (Foucault,
2001c: 1150 [575–6]).
This paper aims to address the so far neglected multiplicity of
Foucault’s readings of Descartes, and notably of the Meditations, as
they unfold during the rest of Foucault’s intellectual career, up to the
end of his life.3 Instead of discussing once again Foucault’s characterisa-
tion of the coup de force operated by Descartes in order to silence mad-
ness (Descartes, 2008: 14) – which Foucault construes as the condition of
possibility for the emergence of the modern subject – it focuses, first, on
his interpretation of Descartes’ philosophy in a series of unpublished
texts he wrote and lectures he gave when teaching at the University of
Tunis between 1966 and 1968 (Section II). It then addresses the import-
ant shifts that took place in Foucault’s thought at the beginning of the
1970s, which contributed to shape his new reading of the Meditations in
terms of ‘discursive events’ (Section III). Finally, it argues that those
shifts opened up to Foucault the possibility of developing an original
interpretation of Descartes’ philosophy, surprisingly close to his own
interest in ancient ask esis and the techniques of the self (Section IV). I
thus hope to show that it would be a mistake to contrast Descartes and
Foucault as the archetypal examples of two diametrically opposite ways
of practising philosophy.4
II
A few months after the publication of The Order of Things, Foucault
obtained a secondment from the University of Clermont-Ferrand to
teach philosophy at the Faculté des Lettres et Sciences Humaines of
the University of Tunis. In the autumn of 1966, he thus moved to Sidi
Bou Saı̈d. He would permanently leave Tunisia only two years later, in
October 1968.5 Among the texts that Foucault wrote and the lectures
that he gave during those years, two are particularly interesting for the
purpose of this paper. On the one hand, an autograph manuscript titled
Le discours philosophique (Philosophical Discourse), which was probably
the first version of a book that Foucault subsequently abandoned
(Foucault, ms1).6 On the other hand, a lecture course on Descartes in
which Foucault offers a detailed analysis of the Discourse on the Method
and the Meditations on First Philosophy.7
In these texts, Foucault presents Descartes as both the ‘founder of
modern philosophy’ and the ‘perverter [dévoyeur] of philosophy in gen-
eral’ (Foucault, ms2: 1), thus combining a traditional claim with one that
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is far more surprising and enigmatic. In order to explore this twofold role
played by Descartes in the history of Western philosophy, in what
appears to be the final lecture of his course Foucault addresses the
(opposite) readings of Descartes developed by Hegel and Nietzsche, on
the one hand, and by Husserl and Heidegger, on the other. Foucault’s
main claim, here, is that ‘the question of Descartes is linked to the whole
interpretation that we give of what philosophy is and should be’ (p. 20),
or better, of what ‘philosophical discourse’ is and should be ‘in its totality
and in its own nature’ (p. 22). The problem that Foucault raises in these
texts is therefore different – and much broader – than the simple issue of
the exclusion of madness in theMeditations.8 It is rather for him a matter
of studying the historical transformations (and, albeit indirectly, the con-
temporary status) of philosophical discourse, thus emphasising both its
singularity and its multiple relations with other forms of discourse: sci-
entific discourse, literary discourse, everyday discourse, religious dis-
course. In other words, after tracing an archaeology of the human
sciences (Foucault, 1966),9 and before – or while he was also – discover-
ing the Anglo-American ‘analytic’ philosophy (Lorenzini, 2019) and
starting to gather materials for The Archaeology of Knowledge (1969),
Foucault decided to write the archaeology of the discipline he was for the
first time ‘officially’ teaching: philosophy.
Since the beginning of Greek philosophy, Foucault argues, philoso-
phers have always been called upon both to interpret and to heal, that is,
to use their discourse both to formulate meaning and to conjure evil.
Contemporary philosophical discourse, however, eschews the ‘inter-
twined figure of meaning and evil’: it is not an interpretation and it
refuses to be a therapeutic (Foucault, ms1: 4). Philosophers nowadays
‘must simply say what there is’, without any hindsight or distance in the
moment they speak: they must say, or better, diagnose, ‘what ‘‘today’’ is’
(p. 5).10 Philosophical discourse thus appears to be a strange, unique
discourse which aims to understand the status of, and the singular rela-
tion it establishes with, the subject who utters it ‘here’ and ‘at present [à
présent]’ (p. 37). In other words, Foucault defines philosophical discourse
not on the basis of its content or form, but focusing on ‘the relation it
establishes with what supports it – with this now [maintenant] which,
from within its statements [énoncés], locates its here, its at present and
its subject’ (p. 37).
With respect to the history of this strange, unique discourse, Descartes
plays, according to Foucault, a pivotal role: his work constitutes a
moment of rupture while also marking a new beginning. This is why
the formula ‘Western philosophy since Descartes’ recurs incessantly,
like a mantra, in Le discours philosophique. But what precisely do this
rupture and new beginning consist in? The answer, Foucault argues, is to
be found in Descartes’ elaboration of a new way of conceiving of the
subject. However, Foucault emphasises that, by newly questioning the
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subject, philosophy since Descartes does not seek to solve the enigma of
interiority, nor to analyse consciousness (i.e. what it is to think), nor to
define the essence of the ‘I’. These are only the main visible consequences,
at the level of philosophical themes and objects, of what Foucault pre-
sents as a necessity intrinsic to philosophical discourse as such, or better,
to philosophical discourse as it was (re)defined by Descartes. In relation
to the triad of the ‘I-here-at present’ that philosophical discourse could
not eschew, the theory of the subject had (and still has, at least in part) a
very precise function to perform: preventing the irreducibility of the
‘now’ of its formulation from taking away the value of universal truth
that philosophical discourse is supposed to have (Foucault, ms1: 19). In
other words, the function of the modern theory of the subject consists in
authorising philosophical discourse ‘to circulate, without alteration, as
an anonymous discourse’, thus allowing it, ‘in spite of the indelible now
[maintenant] of its original formulation, to be uttered under any sky and
by anyone’ (p. 19).11 Detached from its ‘now’ and transformed into a
pure self-consciousness, the subject can have access to a truth which
presents itself in the form of the founding évidence,12 thereby construing
itself as a universal subject. Thus, what Foucault calls the ‘functional
cycle of the subject in relation to discourse’ comes full circle: ‘Only a
self-conscious and universal subject can guarantee the validity of a dis-
course such as that of Western philosophy’ (p. 20).
Consequently, Descartes’ cogito plays a crucial role in Foucault’s eyes
because, in a sense, it contributed to define the whole discursive regime of
modern Western philosophy. Since Descartes, Foucault claims, philoso-
phy has experienced ‘as a danger to itself that which endangers the sov-
ereignty of the ‘‘I think’’’, thus considering ‘anything that escapes the
form of the cogito’ as an illusion or a ‘naive objectivity’ (Foucault, ms1:
20). Once again, Foucault clearly insists that this ‘inseparable entangle-
ment’ of the cogito with the very existence of Western philosophy is
neither ‘the result of an interest in the human being and the secrets of
his interiority’, nor the increasingly profound oblivion of the original
openness of truth. It is rather an intrinsic necessity of philosophical
discourse as it came to be defined in the seventeenth century, notably
by Descartes (pp. 20–21). The Cartesian subject, that is, the subject of
modern philosophy, is therefore considered by Foucault as a mere ‘dis-
course effect’ – the effect of a discourse which, since Descartes, is unique,
isolable and perfectly singular (p. 22). Indeed, in Descartes’ time and (at
least in part) through his work, a ‘general mutation in the order of
discourses’ took place: religious, scientific, literary and philosophical
discourses all began to function in a new way (p. 53). This ‘new way’,
Foucault suggests, is still largely ours because, notwithstanding a fun-
damental rupture introduced in the order of philosophical discourse
by Nietzsche’s work (I will come back to this point in Section V), ‘we
still easily recognise our thinking, our system of truth, our order of
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things in what was inaugurated in the first half of the seventeenth cen-
tury’ (p. 55).
The main feature of this crucial transformation ‘to which Descartes’
work bears witness’ consists in the fact that philosophical discourse for
the first time freed itself from the influence of the other major types of
discourse, suddenly assuming the form it has retained until today
(Foucault, ms1: 68). Admitting no other starting point than the simple
évidence of the ‘I think’, Western philosophy established itself in its
autonomy, that is, it set itself apart from all the other kinds of discourse
and marked ‘its appearance as a discourse which establishes immediate,
ineffaceable and indefinite relations with its own now [maintenant]’
(p. 69). On the one hand, since Descartes, philosophical discourse resem-
bles a religious commentary of Scripture, insofar as both must justify ‘the
relation between a truth without place or time and the singularity of a
discourse in which this truth is manifested’; however, these two dis-
courses also clearly differ from one another in that philosophical dis-
course aims to ‘show how the now [maintenant] of a discourse,
whatever it may be, can allow it to gain access to a truth that does not
depend on it’ (pp. 70–71). Thus, with Descartes and after him, philoso-
phy does keep speaking of God, the soul and the world, as the demon-
strative order of the Meditations plainly shows. Yet this continuity is
misleading, Foucault argues, for a decisive shift occurs in Descartes’
text: ‘God, the soul and the world have ceased to be objects for philoso-
phy’; instead, they have become ‘functional elements within its dis-
course’, and they are now part of ‘the economy of philosophical
discourse and of the indefinite relation it establishes with its now [main-
tenant]’ (pp. 79–80). In other words, in Descartes’ work, God, the soul
and the world have lost ‘their privilege as primary and constitutive
objects, entering instead a system in which they might as well not exist,
since their non-existence and the forms it may take play exactly the same
role as they do’ (p. 80).
This, according to Foucault, explains
why Western philosophy has not ceased, for three centuries now, to
be destruction and end of Metaphysics. Indeed, as it was trans-
mitted to the seventeenth century by a long tradition, metaphysics
was a discourse that had the soul, the world and God as its objects.
Without the need to demonstrate their unquestionable non-exis-
tence, without even ceasing to speak of them – or their equivalents
– in one way or another, without having to turn away from them,
philosophy gave up being metaphysics from the moment in which,
paradoxically, it came as close as possible to these ‘objects’, assim-
ilating and internalising them, transforming them into functional
elements of its discourse. (Foucault, ms1: 82)
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It surely does not come as a surprise that, according to Foucault, the
decisive mutation in this regard took place in ‘those Meditations which
bore precisely the title of Metaphysics and in which the existence of God,
the knowledge of the soul and the reality of the world were summoned to
found the truth of [philosophical] discourse’ (Foucault, ms1: 83).
III
Most of the ideas developed in Le discours philosophique, and notably in
the reading of Descartes’s work he offers there, will remain central to
Foucault’s views in the 1970s and 1980s. For instance, in the 9 December
1970 lecture of his first course at the Collège de France, The Will to
Know, Foucault claims that ‘the text in which Descartes sets out his
desire to arrive at the truth, lists the reasons for doubting and excludes
the possibility of he himself being mad’, deserves to be considered as a
‘philosophical operator’ – that is, as one of those rare texts concerning
and acting on ‘the status of philosophical discourse in general’ (Foucault,
2011b: 7 [6]). In the early 1970s, however, Foucault’s reading of the
Meditations also undergoes very significant transformations, the most
important of which is explicitly addressed in a letter that Foucault
wrote to Jean-Marie Beyssade in November 1972.13 There, Foucault
insists on the importance of emphasising the ‘series’ of the ‘meditative
exercise’ in the analysis of Descartes’ Meditations, instead of focusing
exclusively on the ‘order of reasons’: indeed, it is only at the level of ‘the
discursive events of the text that the relation to madness becomes prob-
lematic’ (Foucault, 2011a: 92).
Foucault thus acknowledges that, compared to 1961, his view has
changed. It was precisely because, in the History of Madness, he had
centred his analysis on the ‘order of reasons’ that the exclusion of mad-
ness had appeared, in relation to it, as a furtive and violent gesture, one
that seemed to contradict the systematicity of Descartes’ discourse. Ten
years later, after developing his archaeological method, the question that
Foucault wants to explore is different. Consequently, his interpretation
of the exclusion of madness in the Meditations is also different:
My attention had to be drawn to the ‘discursive events’, the mod-
alities of the subject’s inclusion in the discourse, in order to allow
me to grasp the coherence of a movement that is specific, but that
also fits the order of reasons; the procedures taking place [in the
Meditations], the game of qualifications and disqualifications, do
not interfere with the order of reasons. (Foucault, 2011a: 93)
In ‘My body, this paper, this fire’ (1972), while refraining from formulat-
ing any explicit self-criticism, Foucault insists on the same point and
makes it the cornerstone of his response to Derrida.14 Indeed, if
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Derrida and the other ‘classical commentators’ did not notice the differ-
ence that exists, in Descartes’ text, between his treatment of dream and
error on the one hand, and of madness on the other, it is precisely –
Foucault argues – because they did not employ the archaeological
method. Relying on this ‘pedagogy which teaches the student that
there is nothing outside the text’, they reduced discursive practices to
textual traces, thus ignoring discursive events and ‘leaving only marks
for a reading’ (Foucault, 2001b: 1135 [573]). Consequently, they ended
up erasing the subject’s concrete modes of involvement in discourse. By
contrast, Foucault famously defines the project of an archaeology of
knowledge in terms of a ‘description of discursive events as the horizon
for the search for the unities that form within it’: the archaeologist does
not analyse language (la langue) as a ‘finite body of rules that authorises
an infinite number of performances’, but studies discourse (le discours)
from the perspective of ‘discursive events’, i.e. ‘a grouping that is always
finite and limited at any moment to the linguistic sequences that have
been formulated’ (Foucault, 1969: 38–9 [29–30]). In other words, while
the analysis of language focuses on the rules according to which a given
statement was constructed, and thus other similar statements could be
constructed, the ‘description of discursive events’ asks why ‘one particu-
lar statement appeared rather than another’ (p. 39 [30]).
But what exactly does it mean to address Descartes’ Meditations from
an archaeological perspective? To the points already developed in Le
discours philosophique, Foucault now adds that it is crucial to pay atten-
tion to the title of Descartes’ text. If any discourse ‘is made up of a group
of statements which are produced each in their own space and time, as so
many discursive events’, it is their exact status that must be analysed in its
singularity. When this status is that of a pure demonstration, the dis-
course must be studied at the level of the formal rules linking the state-
ments to one another. In this case, the ‘subject of the discourse’ is not
involved in it and remains, in relation to the demonstration, ‘fixed,
invariant and as though neutralised’ (Foucault, 2001b: 1125 [562–3]).
This is what Foucault suggested in the History of Madness: by focusing
on the ‘order of reasons’, he developed an analysis of Descartes’ text as a
purely demonstrative discourse, and he thus interpreted the exclusion of
madness as an extra-discursive event – one produced by a coup de force
establishing that the subject of the Meditations could not be mad.
By contrast, to construe the exclusion of madness in the path of the
Cartesian doubt as a ‘discursive event’ means to deny that Descartes’ text
is purely demonstrative. A ‘mediation’, Foucault argues in his response to
Derrida, is a specific kind of discourse, which produces discursive events
(the cogito being one of them) involving ‘a series of modifications in the
enunciating subject’ (Foucault, 2001b: 1125 [563]).15 Thus, far from being
fixed, invariant and neutralised, the subject of Descartes’ Meditations is
‘mobile and capable of being modified by the very effect of the discursive
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events that take place’: not only is he transformed through what is said in
the meditation and ‘ceaselessly altered by his own movement’, but his
own discourse produces effects, exposes him to risks and subjects him to
tests [épreuves] that confer upon him a status ‘which he in no sense pos-
sessed at the initial moment’ (p. 1125 [563]).
The exclusion of madness, therefore, does not occur outside the dis-
course of the Meditations, but within and through it. The cogito does not
‘unveil’, in the course of a pure demonstration, a subject already pre-
supposed by Descartes’ discourse. On the contrary, the subject of the ‘I
think, therefore I am’ is produced by the discourse of the Meditations – it
is one of its main effects. Foucault now argues that Descartes’ text
deserves to be considered as a ‘demonstrative meditation’, that is, both
as ‘a group of propositions forming a system, which each reader must run
through if he wishes to experience their truth’, and as ‘a group of modi-
fications forming an exercise, which each reader must carry out, and by
which each reader must be affected, if he wishes in his turn to be the
subject enunciating this truth on his own account’ (Foucault, 2001b:
1125–6 [563]). For instance, in the First Meditation, Descartes establishes
in a demonstrative fashion that ‘waking can never be distinguished from
sleep by any conclusive indications’, and he similarly discusses the
dream-hypothesis and the hypothesis of a deceitful ‘evil spirit’
(Descartes, 2008: 14–17). These passages, in Foucault’s terms, form a
system. There are other moments, however, in which it is clear that
Descartes’ demonstrative arguments are not enough and need to be sup-
plemented by ascetic exercises. Think of Descartes’ claim that ‘it is not
enough to have realised all this, I must take care to remember it: for my
accustomed opinions continually creep back into my mind, and take
possession of my belief, which has, so to speak, been enslaved to them
by long experience and familiarity, for the most part against my will’;
think also of his acknowledgement, at the end of the First Meditation,
that ‘to carry out this plan [i.e. never to give his assent to anything false]
requires great effort’ because ‘there is a kind of indolence that drags me
back to my customary way of life’ (pp. 16–17).16
It is thus through a constant alternation of systematic statements and
ascetic exercises that the reader of the Meditations is led to the truth –
one which is not and cannot be simply ‘demonstrated’, but must be
‘experienced’ thanks to a meditative practice that the reader is asked to
perform in order to both transform himself and gain access to the truth.
IV
Foucault’s reading of Descartes’ Meditations, as originally presented in
the History of Madness, undergoes significant revisions well before the
1980s – a point that has rarely been emphasised by commentators.
If there is little doubt that Foucault, between 1982 and 1984, elaborates
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a new approach to Descartes’ text (Monod, 2013), it is important to
notice that he does so by building on ideas already developed in Le
discours philosophique and in his response to Derrida more than ten
years before.
Foucault mentions Descartes once again in the 6 February 1980 lecture
of his course at the Collège de France, On the Government of the Living.
There, after (re)defining the concept of ‘regime of truth’ as ‘that which
determines the obligations of individuals with regard to procedures of
manifestation of truth’ (Foucault, 2012a: 91 [93]),17 Foucault raises
the example of the regime of truth inaugurated by Descartes. When, in
the Discourse on the Method, Descartes (2006: 28) affirms the unquestion-
able truth of the ‘I think, therefore I am’ (cogito ergo sum), he can only do
so, according to Foucault, because under the explicit and theoretically
unanswerable ‘therefore’ of this proposition lies another, implicit ‘there-
fore’, which indicates the subject’s acceptance of a certain regime of truth:
‘It is true, therefore I submit’. Évidence alone cannot explain the subject’s
acceptance of the truth of the cogito: the subject accepts this truth only
because he has been ‘qualified in a certain way’, and in particular because
the path of the Cartesian doubt has already excluded the possibility for
him of being mad (p. 96 [98]). In order for the subject to be able to say:
‘When it is true, and evidently true, I will submit’ and, when faced with the
proposition ‘I think, therefore I am’, to be able to say: ‘It is evident,
therefore I submit’, the subject must not be mad (p. 96 [98]). Foucault
thus argues that the cogito has binding force only for a subject who has
been constituted within a regime of truth which gives coercive power to
évidence itself. Once again, it is clear that the ‘order of reasons’ (the demon-
strative aspect of Descartes’ text) cannot be detached from the ascetic
modifications undergone by the subject: it is only because the subject
has constituted himself – and has been constituted – in a specific way,
within a specific regime of truth imposing certain obligations on him,
that he ends up considering the proposition ‘I think, therefore I am’ as
an indisputable truth which he has no choice but to accept.
Foucault famously takes up these ideas in the first lecture of The
Hermeneutics of the Subject, where he advances the distinction – inspired
by Pierre Hadot (2002) – between ‘philosophy’ and ‘spirituality’. While
the former can be defined as ‘the form of thought that asks what it is that
enables the subject to have access to the truth and which attempts to
determine the conditions and limits of the subject’s access to the truth’,
the latter, Foucault explains, consists in ‘the search, practice and experi-
ence through which the subject carries out the necessary transformations
on himself in order to have access to the truth’ (Foucault, 2001g: 16 [15]).
On the basis of this distinction, Foucault defines two major ‘phases’ in
the history of Western philosophy.
On the one hand, throughout Greek, Hellenistic and Roman antiquity,
philosophy – that is, the question of the subject’s access to the truth – was
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indissolubly linked to the practice of spirituality: philosophy was con-
ceived as an activity and an experience of self-transformation that qua-
lified the subject in such a way as to enable him to have access to the
truth. Indeed, spirituality postulates that ‘truth is never given to the sub-
ject by right’, by a ‘simple act of knowledge’ justified ‘simply by the fact
that he is the subject’, but rather that the subject must change and
become ‘other than himself’ in order to have the right of access to the
truth.18 The subject, as he is, is not capable of truth, and thus ‘there can
be no truth without a conversion or a transformation of the subject’
(Foucault, 2001g: 17–18 [15]).
On the other hand, the modern age is characterised, Foucault argues,
by a completely different way of structuring the relation between the
subject and truth: it is now knowledge, and knowledge alone, that
gives the subject access to the truth. The subject is thus no longer
required to transform himself in his own being, but only to perform an
act of knowledge. Consequently, philosophy is divorced from the prac-
tice of spirituality: the subject, as he is, becomes capable of truth, and
access to the truth, ‘whose sole condition is henceforth knowledge, will
find reward and fulfilment in nothing else but the indefinite development
of knowledge’ (Foucault, 2001g: 19–20 [17–18]).
In Foucault’s account, Descartes plays once again a decisive, pivotal
role. It should not come as a surprise, however, that the function that
Foucault attributes to Descartes’ work in the path that led philosophy to
separate itself from spirituality and to incorporate the structure of know-
ledge characterising modern science turns out to be ambiguous. On the
one hand, Foucault argues that what he calls the ‘Cartesian moment’ has
philosophically requalified the principle of the ‘know yourself’ (gnothi
seauton), while discrediting the practice of the ‘care of the self’ (epimeleia
heautou). This twofold movement finds its origin in the Meditations,
where Descartes has grounded philosophy on the évidence – i.e. the
indubitable character – of the subject’s own existence. Self-knowledge
has thus become the privileged path to truth, whereas the ascetic
demands associated with the care of the self have been excluded ‘from
the field of modern philosophical thought’ (Foucault, 2001g: 15–16 [14]).
However, as I already observed when addressing Foucault’s reading of
Descartes in Le discours philosophique and in his response to Derrida,
things are more complex than they seem: not only Foucault, in talking of
a ‘Cartesian moment’, refrains from suggesting that this shift took place
‘on the day Descartes laid down the rule of évidence or discovered the
cogito’ (p. 28 [26]), but he also elaborates a far subtler interpretation of
Descartes’ work itself.
It is helpful to refer here to Hadot’s criticism of Foucault’s interpret-
ation of the role played by Descartes in the history of the relations
between philosophy and spirituality. In the interview, ‘On the genealogy
of ethics: An overview of work in progress’ (1983), Foucault discusses
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some of the main ideas of his lecture course, The Hermeneutics of the
Subject. He notably argues that, in antiquity, ‘a subject could not have
access to the truth if he did not first operate upon himself a certain work
which would make him susceptible to knowing the truth’, and that
Descartes ‘broke with this when he said: ‘‘To accede to truth, it suffices
that I be any subject which can see what is evident’’’ (Foucault, 1984: 371).
Thus, ‘évidence is substituted for ascesis’ and ‘the relationship to the self no
longer needs to be ascetic to get into relation to the truth’ (p. 371). A few
years later, Hadot resolutely criticises this reading and argues that, ‘when
Descartes chose to give one of his works the title Meditations, he knew
perfectly well that the word designated an exercise of the soul within the
tradition of ancient and Christian spirituality’: each ‘meditation’ is to be
taken as a spiritual exercise, ‘which must be finished before one can move
to the next stage’ (Hadot, 1995: 396 [264]). According to Hadot, Descartes’
Meditations urge the reader to engage in a practice of self-transformation
as a necessary condition for reaching the truth. Consequently, Hadot con-
cludes, Foucault is mistaken in maintaining that Cartesian évidence is
accessible to any subject, because ‘évidence can only be perceived through
a spiritual exercise’ (Hadot, 2002: 310–11).19
Hadot’s criticism, however, misses its target. Indeed, in the French ver-
sion of the interview to which Hadot refers, and already in his response to
Derrida, Foucault makes it abundantly clear that Descartes’ ‘substitution’
of évidence for ask esis ‘was only possible for Descartes himself at the cost
of a process which was that of the Meditations, during which he consti-
tuted a relationship of self to self qualifying him as a subject of true
knowledge in the form of évidence’ (Foucault, 2001d: 1449). In the
English version of the interview, Foucault explicitly claims that
‘Descartes wrote ‘‘meditations’’ – and meditations are a practice of the
self’ (Foucault, 1984: 371). However, according to Foucault, through the
Meditations Descartes ‘succeeded in substituting a subject as founder of
practices of knowledge for a subject constituted through practices of the
self’ (p. 371). As he argues in another interview from 1984:
Reading Descartes, it is remarkable to find in the Meditations this
same spiritual concern [as in ancient philosophy] with the attain-
ment of a mode of being where doubt would no longer be permis-
sible, and where one could finally know. But by thus defining the
mode of being to which philosophy gives access, one realises that
this mode of being is defined entirely in terms of knowledge, and
that philosophy in turn is defined in terms of the access to the
knowing subject, or to what qualifies the subject as such. From
this perspective, it seems to me that philosophy superimposes the
functions of spirituality upon the ideal of a grounding for scientif-
icity. (Foucault, 2001f: 1542 [294])
Lorenzini 11
In all these texts from the 1980s, Foucault develops a reading of Descartes,
and notably of the Meditations, that is far subtler than what Hadot sug-
gests. As was already the case in Le discours philosophique, Descartes plays,
in Foucault’s view, a pivotal role: while being situated in continuity with
the ancient tradition which considers philosophy as essentially linked to
the demands of spirituality, Descartes’ work also has the function and
effect of ‘turning’ this tradition against itself, relying on the resources of
spirituality in order to constitute a subject of knowledge henceforth freed
from ascetic obligations (McGushin, 2007: 192). This is just another way
of saying that the regime of truth grounded on the évidence of the cogito,
after emerging from an ascetic exercise of transformation of the subject,
hides its historical origin (and the very fact that it is a ‘regime’) behind the
idea that the ‘therefore’ linking the ‘I think’ and the ‘I am’ is an évidence
that any subject (provided he is not mad) must recognise and accept.
V
More than 20 years after the publication of the History of Madness,
Foucault’s reading of the Meditations thus settles on the claim that,
although it has a ‘subjective character’ and belongs to the tradition of
spirituality, Descartes’ text ultimately aims to constitute – through a
series of ascetic exercises – an ‘anonymous ‘‘I’’’ (Foucault, 2001a: 579).
From that moment on, the truth of the cogito became accessible to every-
one without the need for them to undertake a ‘spiritual’ transformation.
As Foucault already wrote in one of his Tunis manuscripts, ‘Descartes’
‘‘I’’ in the Discourse is not the ‘‘I’’ of the Meditations’: while the former is
a ‘biographical ‘‘I’’ who is looking for a method (perhaps not valid for
everyone)’, the latter is an ‘anonymous ‘‘I’’ that everyone can inhabit’
(Foucault, ms3: 4). Everyone except for the madman, of course.
In this paper, I hope to have shown that Foucault’s reading of Descartes
becomes increasingly complex and subtle between the mid-1960s and the
early 1970s, thus opening up to him the possibility of developing, a few
years later, an explicitly ‘ascetic’ interpretation of the Meditations – one
that turns out to be surprisingly close to his own interest in ancient ask esis
and the techniques of the self.20 At the same time, however, it is clear that
Foucault still wants to criticise the effects of this specific practice of the
self.21 Indeed, the aim or telos of Descartes’ text is paradoxical: to consti-
tute, through ask esis, a subject who, in order to gain access to the truth,
will no longer need ascetic exercises, but only rules of method modelled on
those characterising the pursuit of scientific knowledge. Thus, what
Descartes accomplishes through the Meditations goes far beyond the
mere exclusion of madness from the domain of reason: by indissolubly
linking truth and évidence, he ‘tricks’ the reader into thinking that he no
longer needs to work on and transform himself in order to attain the truth.
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In short, Descartes ultimately excludes from the domain of reason – and of
philosophical discourse – what we could call the ascetic subject.22
According to Foucault, Nietzsche’s work would eventually induce a
new shift in the history of Western thought, thus transforming the mode
of philosophical discourse inaugurated by Descartes.23 Indeed, contrary
to Descartes and his ‘metaphysics of knowledge’ (Foucault, ms2: 5), it is
impossible ‘to say ‘‘I’’ in Nietzsche’s place’ (Foucault, 2001a: 579):
Instead of the philosopher who erases himself from his own dis-
course, [. . .] who removes from his own discourse all the demon-
stratives that can refer to his own existence, we now have the
philosopher who makes his character speak, together with his com-
plexion, his disease, the irritation of his nerves, and who must then
designate the subject of philosophical discourse in the rigorously
demonstrative form: Ecce homo. (Foucault, ms1: 153)
Nietzsche’s Ecce homo ‘reverses term by term the features of the philo-
sophical subject’: where since Descartes, and due to his suppression of
the ascetic subject, there reigned a pure personal pronoun – a non-ascetic
subject – whose ‘meaning could rightfully be carried out by any subject
speaking in turn’, with Nietzsche ‘a pure and simple statement [arises]
made by the philosopher about himself: here he is’ (Foucault, ms1: 153).
This transformation opens up once again the possibility of the mad phil-
osopher – the possibility, that is, for madness of exercising ‘its right over
the philosopher’s discourse’, as was already the case with all the other
kinds of discourse (p. 156).
To preserve and incessantly reactivate this possibility by reintroducing
the ascetic subject into philosophical discourse is one of Foucault’s main
goals – a goal which became more explicit at the end of his life (notably in
his study of ancient techniques of the self and parr esia), but which, as I
argued in this paper, can be traced back to some of his writings from the
1960s. This project had to address Descartes’ Meditations in order to lay
bare the ambiguity that lies at the heart of his ‘discovery’ of the cogito
and to construe philosophy once again as a task and an exercise that
entails an indefinite risk: since the truth is not given to the (philoso-
phising) subject by right, it could very well remain unattained. It is
only by accepting this risk that philosophy can be conceived and prac-
tised as a truly creative and experimental endeavour.
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Unless otherwise noted, all translations are my own.
1. Foucault (1972: 56–9 [44–7]) famously argues that, when encountering mad-
ness on the methodical path of his doubt, Descartes does not evade its dan-
gers ‘in the same way that he sidesteps the possibility of dream or error’.
Indeed, ‘it is not the permanence of truth that ensures that thought is not
madness’, but rather ‘an impossibility of being mad which is inherent in the
thinking subject rather than the object of his thoughts’: one simply cannot
suppose to be mad, ‘even in thought, for madness is precisely a condition of
impossibility for thought’. Therefore, according to Foucault, Descartes’
Meditations bear witness to the reduction of madness to silence characteristic
of the modern ‘age of reason’: ‘Madness has been banished. While man can
still go mad, thought, as the sovereign exercise carried out by a subject seeking
the truth, can no longer be devoid of reason. A new dividing line has
appeared, rendering that experience so familiar to the Renaissance – unrea-
sonable Reason, or reasoned Unreason – impossible’.
2. On the Foucault/Derrida debate, see among others Allen (2016); Boyne
(1990); De Ville (2010); Evangelou (2017: 187–203); Huffer (2016);
Macherey (2016); McGushin (2016); Rekret (2017); Revel (2016).
3. A relevant exception to the rule is McGushin (2007: 175–94), who rightly notes
that ‘Foucault’s encounter with the thought of Descartes spans the length of his
intellectual career’ and suggests that Foucault’s earlier interpretation of
Descartes in the History of Madness and The Order of Things should be recon-
ceived in light of his later work on the care of the self and parr esia (p. 175).
McGushin’s reading, however, departs from mine in that he tends to simply
apply Foucault’s ideas from the 1980s to his texts from the 1960s and 1970s: for
him, Foucault is describing the emergence of ‘a new practice of subjectivity’
already when addressing Descartes’ Meditations in the History of Madness–one
that, moreover, can be straightforwardly read in terms of the notion of the
‘Cartesian moment’ coined in 1982 (pp. 177–8). Therefore, McGushin does
not address the successive changes in Foucault’s reading of Descartes’
Meditations that I reconstruct in this paper. In addition, by arguing that
Descartes’ text attempts to ‘free us by placing us under the proper authority
and figure of government: reason defined in terms of method and evidence
[évidence]’, and thus that it constitutes ‘a new foundation for, and form of,
philosophical parr esia’ (p. 180), McGushin risks downplaying the critical
dimension of Foucault’s reading of Descartes, one that can be found also in
his analyses of parr esia – for instance, when Foucault explicitly contrasts
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parr esia as a ‘verbal activity’ and the ‘mental experience’ of Cartesian évidence
(Foucault, 2019a: 42). On this point, see Lorenzini (2017: 66–72).
4. As Prado (1992), among others, does.
5. For more details on the different aspects of Foucault’s stay in Tunisia,
see the papers collected in the special issue of the journal CELAAN,
‘Michel Foucault en Tunisie (1966–1968)’ (vol. 12, no. 1–2, Spring
2015), as well as Medien (2020). See also Séglard (2007), who focuses
specifically on two lectures that Foucault gave in 1967 at the Tahar
Haddad Club in Tunis, and which were recently published in Foucault
(2019b).
6. The critical edition of this manuscript and of Foucault’s lecture course, La
place de l’homme dans la pensée occidentale moderne (The Place of Man in
Modern Western Thought), is currently being prepared by Orazio Irrera and
myself. It is scheduled to be published in 2023 as part of the new Seuil-
Gallimard book series ‘Cours et travaux de Michel Foucault avant le
Collège de France’.
7. Unfortunately, only the autograph manuscript of a lecture on Descartes –
probably the final lecture of Foucault’s course, on ‘The History of
Cartesianism’ (Foucault, ms2) – and a manuscript offering a schematic ana-
lysis of the Meditations (Foucault, ms3) seem to have been preserved. For a
detailed plan of Foucault’s lecture course on Descartes, see Boubaker-Triki
(2008: 112–13).
8. It is worth noticing that, in the manuscript on the Meditations, Foucault
does not mention this topic at all (Foucault, ms3). The issue of the exclusion
of madness only (and briefly) comes up in Le discours philosophique, specif-
ically when Foucault addresses the ‘mutation’ introduced by Nietzsche’s
work at the level of the relations between philosophical discourse and its
utterer – one that opens up ‘the possibility of the mad philosopher’, which
had previously been excluded by Descartes (Foucault, ms1: 155–6). I shall
come back to this point in Section V.
9. In The Order of Things, Descartes is only mentioned a few times as his work,
according to Foucault, contributed to the emergence of the ‘Classical age’,
that of representation (Foucault, 1966: 65–6 [56–8]).
10. Foucault famously takes up again the (philosophical) question of ‘today’ in
his texts on Kant’s Was ist Aufklärung?, one of which also addresses the
singularity of Kant’s approach to this question compared to his predeces-
sors’, and namely to Descartes’ (Foucault, 2001e: 1498–9).
11. For a similar characterisation of what Foucault, in 1973, calls ‘scientific
knowledge’ or ‘truth-demonstration’ (a truth that is ‘everywhere, in every
place and all the time’), see Foucault (2003: 235 [236]).
12. Here and in countless other places throughout his work, Foucault is refer-
ring to the first rule of Descartes’ method, which, in France, is known as
‘règle de l’évidence’: ‘Ne recevoir aucune chose pour vraie que je ne la connusse
évidemment être telle’. This sentence is translated into English by Ian
Maclean as ‘Never to accept anything as true that I did not incontrovertibly
know to be so’ (Descartes, 2006: 17). The problem is that Foucault usually
refers to this rule simply by using the term ‘évidence’, which cannot be
translated as ‘evidence’ (as unfortunately most of the existing translations
of Foucault do), nor for that matter as ‘clarity and distinctness’ – Descartes
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famously claims that this rule entails including ‘nothing in my judgments
than that which presented itself to my mind so clearly and distinctly that I
would have no occasion to doubt it’ (p. 17). In this paper, I thus decided to
use the French word ‘évidence’.
13. Jean-Marie Beyssade had sent Foucault his article ‘‘‘Mais quoi, ce sont des
fous’’: Sur un passage controversé de la Première Méditation’, which would
be published the following year (Beyssade, 1973). In his letter, Foucault
responds to the arguments developed in that article.
14. Going into the details of Derrida’s reading (and criticisms) of Foucault’s
project in the History of Madness is clearly outside the scope of this paper.
What is relevant here is, above all, Derrida’s claim that ‘no historical ques-
tion about [Descartes]–about the latent historical meaning of his discourse,
about its place in a total structure–can be answered before a rigorous and
exhaustive internal analysis of his manifest intentions, of the manifest mean-
ing of his philosophical discourse has been made’ (Derrida, 1963: 475 [53]).
According to this ‘internal analysis’, Derrida argues, the dissociation that
Foucault operates between delirium and madness on the one hand, and
sensation and dreams on the other, turns out to be incorrect: indeed, the
reference to dreams is not put off to one side ‘in relation to a madness
potentially respected or even excluded by Descartes’, but constitutes ‘the
hyperbolical exasperation of the hypothesis of madness’, since the latter is
not ‘a good instrument of doubt’ as it is only ‘a single case – and not the
most serious one – among all cases of sensory error’ (p. 482 [61–2]). On the
dream-hypothesis in Descartes’ First Meditation and the related controversy
between Foucault and Derrida, see McGushin (2018).
15. According to the notes that Mohamed Jaoua and Mouldi Younis took during
Foucault’s lecture course on Descartes at the University of Tunis, already in
that context Foucault mentioned the ‘religious connotation’ of the word
‘meditation’, arguing that the latter ‘is an exercise of the intellect and of the
will’ which played a very significant role in the history of Christian spirituality
– one that Descartes took up when writing the Meditations. On this point, see
Foucault (2012a): ‘We should never forget that Descartes’ malicious demon is
not at all the bizarre and extreme invention of a radical attempt by philosophy
to retake possession of itself. The malicious demon, the idea that there is
something in me that can always deceive me and that has such power that
I can never be sure it will not deceive me is the absolutely constant theme of
Christian spirituality’ (p. 298 [303]). See also Foucault (2012b: 167–8 [170]). It
is important to emphasise, however, that when Foucault speaks of the
Meditations as a ‘spiritual’ practice in the 1980s, the word ‘spiritual’ has
lost its exclusively religious connotation and has come to indicate more gen-
erally the necessity for the subject to transform himself in order to gain access
to the truth. On the crucial influence exerted on Descartes by the Christian
spiritual tradition, see Menn (1998) and Mercer (2014, 2017).
16. For the analysis of (some of) the aspects that allow us to construe the
Meditations as a kind of exercise, see McGushin (2007), who rightly focuses
on the frequent references in the text ‘to the passage of time and to
Descartes’ spatial situation as he engages in the meditation’: ‘The duration
of the Meditations, the use and experience of time and the effects of the
passage of time are all ingredients in the work of meditation. This is not the
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case in an argument where time is perceived as inessential, or even an
obstruction. In addition to time, Descartes refers to his spatial situation
frequently, and it is clear that being in the right kind of space, in the right
place, is also essential to the successful meditation’ (pp. 182–3).
17. On the concept of regime of truth, see Lorenzini (2015a).
18. For Foucault’s first elaboration of the link between spirituality and self-
transformation, see Foucault (2020).
19. For a Hadotian reading of Descartes’ Discourse in terms of spiritual exer-
cises, see D’Agostino (2017: 93–162). For a Foucauldian reading of
Descartes’ Meditations as a series of spiritual exercises that aim to modify
the subject’s being in order to give him access to the truth, see McGushin
(2007: 175–194). On the Meditations as a spiritual exercise, see also Rorty
(1986).
20. Foucault defines the latter as the set of techniques ‘which permit individuals
to effect, by their own means [or with the help of other people], a certain
number of operations on their own bodies, on their own souls, on their own
thoughts, on their own conduct, and this in a manner so as to transform
themselves, modify themselves, or to attain a certain state of perfection, of
happiness, of purity, of supernatural power, and so on’ (Foucault, 2015: 25).
For an analysis of Foucault’s study of ancient techniques of the self that
puts it in conversation with Hadot’s work on spiritual exercises and Stanley
Cavell’s notion of moral perfectionism, see Lorenzini (2015b).
21. McGushin (2007) interestingly claims that ‘approaching the Meditations as
spiritual exercises produces the opposite effect in a modern, Cartesian reader
as it would have produced in a premodern reader’, and that ‘recovering the
ascetic dimension of theMeditations serves therefore to destabilise the cogito
– without destroying it – by giving it back its foundation: the practices of the
self which bring it into being’ (p. 194).
22. On this point, see Guenancia (2002), who argues that, in the 1980s, the issue
for Foucault is no longer Descartes’ exclusion of madness, but his exclusion
of ‘a certain form of subjectivity’ (p. 240).
23. On the different roles that the reference to Nietzsche plays in Foucault’s
work between the end of the 1950s and the beginning of the 1970s, see
Bernard Harcourt’s paper in this special issue.
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1973–1974, ed. Jacques Lagrange. Paris: Seuil-Gallimard. [Psychiatric Power:
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work on women in the history of philosophy. Philosophical Studies 174(10):
2539–2555.
Monod, Jean-Claude (2013) La méditation cartésienne de Foucault. Les Études
philosophiques 106: 345–358.
Prado, Carlos G. (1992) Descartes and Foucault: A Contrastive Introduction to
Philosophy. Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press.
Rekret, Paul (2017) Derrida and Foucault: Philosophy, Politics and Polemics.
London: Rowman & Littlefield.
Revel, Judith (2016) Foucault, Derrida: The effects of critique. In: Custer, Olivia
et al. (eds) Foucault/Derrida Fifty Years Later: The Futures of Genealogy,
Deconstruction and Politics. New York: Columbia University Press, 125–132.
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